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This study was conducted for the Naval Sea Systems Command's
Cost Estimating and Analysis Division, Code 017. Funding was
provided under the Naval Postgraduate School direct funding
allotment, Project Code 54M01.
This study represents a continuation of a line of research
initiated in FY 1989 and reported in "Estimating and Explaining
the Production Cost of High Technology Systems: The Case of
Military Aircraft", Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report No.
54-89-07. A portion of that report provided a preliminary analysis
of relationships between program cost and a collection of
environmental and financial factors. This current study continues
to investigate factors that influence program cost.
As outlined in the 12 July 89 "Memorandum of Understanding",
the current research was to examine cost drivers during the
acquisition of major weapon systems. Year-by-year cost patterns
were to be investigated, with a focus on ship-based weapon systems.
The guiding research question was to be "what factors appear to
cause escalation (or decline) in the cost of weapon systems as an
acquisition program proceeds over time?"
Although a continuation of a prior line of research, this
report is a self-contained document. The report is submitted in
fulfillment of the agreement outlined in the Memorandum of
Understanding. The report is releasable.

EXTENSIONS TO THE LEARNING CURVE:
AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING
UNIT COST OF WEAPON SYSTEMS
Learning curves have gained widespread acceptance as a tool
for analyzing, explaining and predicting the behavior of unit costs
of items produced from a repetitive production process. (See
Yelle, 1979, for a review of learning curve literature.) Cost
estimation techniques for planning the cost of acquiring weapon
systems by the Department of Defense, for example, typically
consider the role of learning in the estimation process. The
premise of learning curve theory is that the cumulative quantity
of units produced is the primary "driver" of the cost of those
units. Unit cost is expected to decline as cumulative quantity
increases.
Past research has attempted to augment learning curve models
by including additional variables. Most attention has been focused
on the addition of a production rate term. This study continues
that line of analysis. The broad objective is to identify factors
(i.e., cost drivers) that may be expected to impact the unit cost
of items produced from a repetitive production process, develop
empirical surrogates for those factors, "enhance" traditional
learning curve models by including the factors in models, and
examine the conditions under which such factors appear to be
important explainers of cost.
The paper starts by presenting some simplified functional
models of the factors that should drive unit cost, the purpose
being to identify plausible candidate variables for inclusion in
learning curve models. Empirical models incorporating these
candidate variables are then presented, along with comments on past
related research. Hypotheses reflecting the expected associations
between cost drivers and unit cost, under differing circumstances,
are offered. Tests of the hypotheses using data from a sample of
eight ship-based tactical missile systems are conducted. Later
analysis then examines prediction errors from the models and




The purpose of this section is to present some simple
functional models of unit cost. All models are simplified
representations of phenomena, all make assumptions, and none are
fully valid. The objective here is to use the models as a basis
for talking through some issues.
At the most basic level the cost of any unit is just the sum
of the variable cost directly incurred in creating the unit and
the share of fixed costs assigned to the unit, where the amount
fixed costs assigned depend on the number of units produced.
UC = VC + FC (1)
PQ
where
UC = Unit cost
VC = Variable cost per unit
FC = Total fixed costs per period
PQ = Production guantity per period
Now let's refine the model to incorporate the effect of
"learning." The fact that labor costs and material costs per unit
tend to decline with successive units produced in a repetitive
production process is well recognized. Employees "learn" the
production tasks, reducing both labor time and material usage. An
assumption here is that learning impacts variable costs. Hence




Q = Cumulative Quantity
VCQ = Variable cost of the Qth unit.
VC
1
= Variable cost of the first unit.
b = Parameter, the learning index, assumed to be
negative.
Substituting into equation (1):




This model incorporates the two factors presumed to impact unit
costs that have been most extensively investigated: learning (Qb )
and production quantities (PQ) . Smith (1980, 1981), for example,
used a model analogous to equation (3) to explore the effect of
different production rates on unit cost. Balut (1981) and Balut,
Gulledge and Womer (1989) construct models based on learning and
production quantity to assist in "redistributing" overhead and
"repricing" unit costs when changes in production rate occur.
Equation (3) is limited because it implicitly assumes that
1The Balut and Balut, Gulledge and Womer models differ in
that they determine a learning rate for total (not variable) unit
cost and then apply an adjustment factor to allow for the impact
of varying production quantity on the amount of fixed cost
included in total cost.
only one kind of item is produced and hence all costs (variable
and fixed) are "direct" or associated with that item. In reality,
of course, firms typically produce multiple items and incur plant-
wide or company-wide costs that are indirect and then allocated to
a specific item. Equation (3) can be refined to incorporate this
idea as follows: 2
UCQ = VC 1 Q
b
+ DFC + IFC (4)
PQ PQ+OQ
where
DFC = Direct fixed cost per period
IFC = Indirect fixed cost per period
OQ = Other quantities — production quantity per period
of items other than that being costed, measured
in units equivalent to PQ.
In this model the contribution of indirect cost (IFC) to unit cost
(UC) depends both on the production quantity of the item being
costed (PQ) and on the production quantity of other items being
produced (OQ) . For simplicity, production quantity and other
quantity can be combined into CQ, the company-wide quantity (i.e.,
CQ = PQ + OQ) and substituted into equation (4)
:
UCQ = VC 1 Q
b
+ DFC + IFC (5)
PQ CQ
Of course, this model is still a simplification. Most firms
have several organizational levels and whether costs are direct or
indirect depend on the level referenced. Multiple items can be
made in one plant, multiple plants may exist in one division,
The formulation assumes that only fixed costs are indirect,
i.e., that all variable costs, because they vary with units of
output, can be directly associated with units of output.
multiple divisions in one firm. Costs that are direct at one level
may be indirect at a lower level, and the process of allocating
indirect costs to lower levels may be complex. The model does,
however, convey the idea that assignment to costs to units depend
on various different measures of volume or quantity.
Last, assume the existence of a "standard" ("benchmark,"
"normal," "planned") production quantity (PQ
S )
. Standard direct
fixed costs per unit (SDFC) at the standard production quantity
would be:
SDFC = DFC (6)
PQ
S
The production rate (PR) for any period can then be expressed
as a ratio of the production quantity to the standard quantity:
PR = P^ (7)
PQ
s
The second term of equation (5) can then be rewritten as:
DFC = SDFC (8)
PQ PR
Assuming a standard company-wide quantity and using analogous
reasoning, the third term of equation (5) can be rewritten as a
ratio of standard indirect fixed cost per unit (SIFC) and a company
rate (CR)
:
IFC = SIFC (9)
AQ CR
and equation (5) rewritten as:
UCQ = VC 1 Q
b
+ SDFC (PR" 1 ) + SIFC (CR" 1 ) (10)
In this final formulation it can be seen that total cost per
unit is the sum of variable cost per unit (adjusted for learning)
plus standard direct fixed cost per unit (adjusted for production
rate)
,
plus standard indirect fixed cost per unit (adjusted for
company rate)
.
Under the heroic (and no doubt invalid) assumption that
changes in any variable on the right hand side of equation (10) do
not necessitate changes in any other variable (i.e., ceteris
paribus)
,
predictions of the impact on unit cost of changes in any
of the variables is straight forward:
a) Unit cost will decrease with increases in cumulative
quantity, but at a slower rate as cumulative quantity increases.
(The relationship is a power function with exponent b. The first
derivative of UC with respect to Q is negative, the second
derivative is positive.)
b) Unit cost will decrease with increases in production rate
per period, but at a slower rate at higher production rates. (The
relationship is a power function with exponent -1. The first
derivative of UC with respect to PR is negative, the second
positive.
)
c) Unit cost will decrease with increases in the company rate
per period, but at a slower rate at higher company rates. (The
relationship is a power function with the exponent -1. The first
derivative of UC with respect to CR is negative, the second
positive.
d) Unit cost will increase with increases in variable or
fixed costs, at a constant rate. (The relationship of UC with VC
1
and SDFC and SIFC is linear.)
Of course, in reality, the ceteris paribus assumption is
unlikely to hold. This is because there are numerous potential
interrelationships and interactions between the variables on the
right hand side of equation (10) that can come into play in a
dynamic environment. Some examples:
a) Variable costs and fixed costs are interdependent. The
issue here is one of cost structure (or operating leverage) . Firms
can tradeoff the incurrence of variable costs versus fixed costs
to achieve an output. An obvious example is automation, which
tends to increase fixed (plant) costs but reduce variable (labor)
costs. The impact on total unit cost is ambiguous. McCullough and
Balut (1986) provide evidence that the fixed component of cost is
increasing as industry moves toward automation.
b) Variable cost and production rate are interdependent.
While increased production rate should reduce fixed cost per unit,
the impact on total cost per unit is ambiguous because production
rate may also influence variable cost. The conventional view
(e.g., Bemis, 1981; Cox and Gansler, 1981) is that there are both
economies and diseconomies of scale, resulting in a U-shaped
relationship between total unit cost and production rate. As rate
increases, unit cost initially declines, due to such factors as
reduction of fixed cost per unit, reduction of variable material
cost per unit (more economical quantity purchases) and reduction
in variable labor cost per unit (less labor time waste) . After an
optimum is reached, increases in production rate result in higher
total unit cost because increases in variable costs more than
offset the additional reduction in fixed cost per unit. One cause
might be the increase in variable labor costs due to the necessity
of overtime. Past research (Smith, 1976) has found that production
rate can be an important explainer of labor costs. Similar
interactions between variable costs and the company rate would also
apply.
c) Production rate and company rate are interrelated. It is
obvious that PR and CR are not independent because production
quantity is one element that makes up the company-wide quantity.
Ceteris paribus, when PR increases, CR increases (but at a slower
rate) . They also interact in a less obvious way due to capacity
constraints. Given a finite productive capacity, increases in PQ
potentially constrain OQ and vice versa.
d) Direct and indirect fixed costs may be interrelated. In
principle direct and indirect fixed costs are distinct. In
practice what fixed costs are considered direct and what are
considered indirect is a function of a firm's accounting system.
The definition of a firm's accounting cost pools and the procedures
for assigning costs to pools, and then to units produced, can
influence the final determination of whether a cost is direct or
indirect.
e) Fixed costs and production quantity are interrelated. It
is typical for a firm to plan the level of some fixed costs (e.g.,
plant, equipment, staff) on the basis of some anticipated
production quantity, starting at a low level for initial units
produced and building capacity as production quantities increase.
s
Thus, for example, increased production rate could be associated
with increases in total unit cost if fixed costs were increased
more than proportionately with the increased production.
f) Cumulative quantity and production rate are interrelated.
This is true in the obvious functional sense that cumulative
quantity over several periods is the sum of all production
quantities in each period. Additionally there tends to be an
empirical relationship due to the tendency for the initial
production rate for a new product to be low relative to rates
typical in later periods, when the design is mature and the "bugs'*
worked out of the process (Boger and Liao, 1990) . This causes a
positive correlation between cumulative quantity and production
quantity per period (low values of both in early periods, high
values in later periods) . Gulledge and Womer (1986) , among others,
document this association.
Additional complexity can be added by altering the perspective
from which "cost" is viewed. More specifically, equation (10)
treats cost from the perspective of the manufacturer. Many
applications are concerned with cost to the buyer, which is price
to the manufacturer, and typically includes a fee, particularly if
procurement occurs under some cost plus arrangement. Thus the
equation for unit cost becomes:
UC Q = VC 1 Q
b
+ SDFC (PR" 1 ) + SIFC (CR" 1 ) + Fee (11)
Obviously unit cost now additionally depends on the mechanism
underlying the calculation of the fee. Without exploring the
details, suffice it to say, that fee may be constant, may be tied
to total costs, may be functionally related to components of cost
(such as facilities employed) or may involve a combination of
arrangements. For those interested White and Hendrix (1984)
provide a review of contract types and fee arrangements.
The broad conclusion to be drawn from the discussion above is
that the factors affecting unit cost are sufficiently numerous, and
the interactions between factors sufficiently complex, that
attempts to develop functional models to be used to either estimate
or explain costs are difficult. Complete models would reguire
extensive data and be virtually a reproduction of a firm's cost
accounting system. Hence, most initial attempts to develop cost
estimating relationships (CERs) tend to be empirically
(statistically) based and rest on the assumption that complex
functional relationships can be represented by simple statistical
relationships, relationships that exist due to regularities in the
data. But a functional model can serve as a basis for selecting
variables to be included in a statistical model and for
hypothesizing the form of the relationship between variables. The
next section presents statistically based cost models, informed by
knowledge of functional relationships.
EMPIRICAL MODELS
Learning Curves : The most common statistical cost model is
the familiar learning curve model:




UCQ = Average unit cost at quantity Q.
a = Theoretical first unit cost, a parameter to be
estimated.
Q = Algebraic midpoint of a particular production lot.
b = Learning curve exponent, a parameter to be
estimated.
The model has gained wide acceptance in practice. 3 Note that the
learning "adjustment" (Qb ) is applied to total unit cost (a) not
just to variable unit cost as in the functional models. The
implicit assumption is that total cost is related to quantity in
the same manner that variable cost is, which is clearly not the
case. So this learning curve model is perhaps best thought of as
a cost improvement model -- where cost improvement is due to a
number of factors, including traditional "learning". Gold (1981)
comments on this:
".
. . most internal improvements. . . represent the results
not of cumulative repetition of past practices, but of changes
in: product designs; product mix; operating technology;
facilities and equipment; management, planning and control;
materials quality; and labor capabilities and incentives. And
such changes result from the active exploration and
development of superior alternatives to past practices by
research personnel, design engineers, production specialists,
and supervisory staff. This may also be termed x learning '-
-if that term means nothing more than the summation of all
improvements regardless of cause.
In short the parameter b is presumed to capture a collection of
3Note that this is an incremented unit cost model rather
than a cumulative average cost model. Liao (1988) discusses the
differences between the two approaches to learning curve models
and discusses why the incremental model has become dominant in
practice. One reason is that the cumulative model weights early
observations more heavily and, in effect, "smooths" away period-
to-period changes in average cost. Since one purpose of this
study is to explore reasons for period-to-period cost changes,
the incremental model is more appropriate.
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effects which in the functional model (equation 10) are separately
reflected in the various rate and fixed costs terms.
Rate models ; Recent attempts to improve cost models have
focused on adding an additional term, reflecting some measure of
rate or activity, to the learning curve model. Approaches differed
depending on the level of aggregation at which activity was viewed.
Consider three levels of aggregation and indicators of rate or
activity associated with each:
Product: Product production rate (PR)
Company: Company-wide activity rate (CR)
Industry: Industry capacity utilization rate (IR)
Note that two terms (PR and CR) are components of equation (10)
while IR is a more aggregated, non-firm specific indicator of
activity.
Most attempts to augment the learning curve model have added
a production rate term (e.g., Alchian, 1963; Bemis, 1981; Cox and
Gansler, 1981; Greer and Liao, 1986; Hirsch, 1952; Large, Hoffmayer
and Kontrovich, 1974; Womer, 1979) as follows:
UCQ = a Q
b PRd (13)
Smith (1980) reviewed many of the production rate studies. The
general conclusion to be drawn from the studies as a group is that
attempts to improve cost models by inclusion of production rate
have not been very successful. In some cases the production rate
term is a significant explainer of cost, in many it is not. In
some cases production rate is negatively associated with cost, in
others it is positive. The specific effect of production rate
appears to vary across systems studied.
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Several explanations can be offered. 1) A focus on
production rate for a single product is too limited, ignoring the
impact of broader activity changes in a firm. 2) A focus on
production rate alone fails to incorporate and control for other
concurrent changes, such as the changing level of fixed costs that
are to be distributed over the production quantities. 3) Varying
results are to be expected because rate changes can lead to both
economies and diseconomies of scale. 4) Production rate effects
are difficult to isolate empirically because of the colinearity
with cumulative quantity. 5) Researchers have usually used total
production '•quantity** as a measure of production "rate", which
leads to misspecif ied models (see Boger and Liao, 1990, for
elaboration)
.
More recent work by Greer and Liao (1983, 1984, 1986, 1987)
augments the learning curve model by adding a measure of industry
activity, industry capacity utilization (IR):
UCQ = aQ
b PRd IR 9 (14)
Much of their analysis was concerned with the effect of industry
capacity utilization on competition and pricing for duel-sourced
weapon systems. But some results were provided for sole-sourced
systems and it is this later analysis (1984, 1986) that is most
relevant here:
There is some cause effect similarity between price
changes induced by changes in capacity utilization and changes
in production rate, R—under sole sourcing. In either case,
fixed costs attach to different quantities of output.
However, capacity utilization changes reflect changes in
overall corporate output. A rate change (R) by itself causes
only a change in the allocation of those fixed costs that
originate in the facility (or segment) used for the program
13
in question. Either of these changes can occur independently
of the other, depending on what is taking place in the rest
of the firm. The two will be identical only if the program
of interest is the firm's only source of revenue. (Greer and
Liao, 1987, p. 279)
Indirect costs are incurred at both the plant level and
the corporate level. Changes in a plant's production rate
affects the allocation of plant level indirect costs to final
cost objectives (contracts) , but, are of relatively minor
importance to the allocation of corporate indirect costs. The
allocation of corporate indirect costs is more closely related
to the overall business volume of the firm. (Greer and Liao,
1987, p. 275)
Their findings indicated that capacity utilization has a more
important effect on unit cost than does production rate, most
likely because individual programs represent only a small element
of a firm's full business activity.
The significance of IR as a cost driver suggests that it
captures something relevant to "activity" and hence to cost
estimation. The obvious issue is the degree to which an industry
capacity utilization measure serves as a useful proxy for firm-
specific activity, and whether an explicit firm-specific measure
can improve cost models. This, of course, suggests an additional
augmentation to the learning curve model by the inclusion of a
company-specific activity rate (CR) term.
UC Q = aQ
b PRd CR f IR9 (15)
Greer and Liao (1984) appropriately justify the use of
industry capacity utilization rather than a firm-specific
activity measure— in their analysis of duel source competition--
by arguing that the objective was to capture "general business
conditions" not firm-specific activity. This justification is
perhaps less applicable in their analysis of sole-source programs
where industry capacity utilization is explicitly argued to be a
proxy for firm-specific activity.
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Evidence on the role of a company-specific activity rate measure
is not available.
Note that PR, CR, and IR are all measures of activity, at
different levels of aggregation. PR and CR are direct components
of the functional model discussed previously (eguation 10) . If
the functional model is "correct," and PR and CR capture the
activity factors that should influence cost, is IR then redundant?
Two points argue for the additional relevance of IR. First,
empirically any measures of PR or CR are likely to be measured with
error. Hence, IR may reflect some aspect of firm specific activity
"missed" by PR and CR measures. Second, industry capacity
utilization could impact cost indirectly through an impact on some
specific cost elements. Any manufacturer must acquire some factors
of production externally. High levels of capacity utilization
could be consistent with high supplier activity and consequently
low supplier per unit costs. This could result in low acquisition
cost of production factors (e.g., materials) and consequently low
manufacturing cost. If such an indirect effect were to occur, it
would not be captured by either PR or CR. In short, at least in
principle, IR is potentially a non-redundant explainer of cost.
Fixed Capacity Costs : The reason for including PR and CR in
a cost model is to incorporate the effects of spreading fixed
capacity costs over varying output. (These variables are
denominators of the second and third terms in equation 10) . But
the impact of PR and CR on unit cost is influenced by any change
in the amount of fixed costs to be spread. This notion, of course,
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is not new (see, for example, Boger and Liao, 1990) but its
incorporation in cost models is generally lacking. The impact of
a change in fixed costs on unit cost is constant at all levels of
fixed cost (i.e., the second derivative is zero). In a learning
curve model this implies a shift of the curve up or down with
changes in fixed cost. To reflect the possible impact of changing
fixed costs, the empirical model can be further extended as
follows:
UC = aQ b PRd CR f IR9 e hFC (16)
where
FC = Fixed cost
e = Constant
h = Parameter for FC
UCQ , Q, PR, CR, IR = Variables previously defined
a, b, d, f, g = parameters
Raising e to the resulting power causes a parallel shift in (the
natural log form of) the cost curve.
HYPOTHESES
To the extent that the empirical model (16) reflects
relationships implied by the functional model (10), UCQ should
depend on Q, PR, CR, IR, and FC. These independent variables can
be considered cost drivers of UC. Ceteris paribus, the expected
associations should be those implied by the functional model.
Expected associations can be summarized in terms of the expected




: Unit cost should decrease with increases in





Unit cost should decrease with increases in
production rate (d < 0)
.
H3 : Unit cost should decrease with increases in a
company-wide activity rate (f < 0).
H
4 :
Unit cost should decrease with increases in industry




: Unit cost should increase with increases in fixed
costs (h > 0)
.
An additional question of interest is whether the variables
in model (16) should be expected to be cost drivers under all
circumstances. Put another way, should all types of costs be
influenced in the same manner by the model (16) cost drivers, or
should associations between cost and the factors "depend"? And if
they depend, on what? Two issues seem relevant.
New Programs versus Follow-On Programs : Some production
programs involve the manufacture of a new design of an item or
system; other programs involve the manufacture of a modified or
revised design of an existing item or system. For example, some
weapon systems are commonly characterized in terms of type, design
and series. The B-52a is an aircraft of B type (bomber) , design
52, series a. Modifications of existing designs represent a new
series (e.g., B-52b) . Should the same pattern of "learning" be
expected for follow-on series of an existing design as for the
first series of a new design? It seems reasonable to argue that
considerable learning may occur during the production of a new
design; new production techniques are developed and production
efficiencies are discovered. Follow-on series should benefit from
the learning achieved during the production of the initial series
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and the opportunity for additional learning should be less. Some
evidence (Moses, 1989) from observing cross sectional differences
in learning rates on weapon system programs supports this idea.
Stated as an hypothesis:
H6 : Greater learning should occur on new programs when
compared to follow-on programs (b
neH
< b follow . on )
Internal Costs versus External Costs : In a broad sense costs
can be segregated into those that are incurred internally by a
manufacturing firm and those that result from the acquisition of
components externally. If manufacturer A chooses to produce a
"part" internally then the cost of that part will reflect material,
labor and, most importantly, overhead costs of manufacturer A. The
cost of the part will reflect both variable and fixed costs of
manufacturer A. If the same part is acquired externally from
supplier B, the cost of the part will represent a variable cost to
manufacturer A. (Fixed overhead costs may be reflected in the
price A pays B for the part, but the cost of the part will then be
influenced by the fixed overhead of supplier B rather than
manufacturer A.)
An analogy can be drawn in the manufacturer of major weapon
systems. Components are often subcontracted out by the prime
contractor. Thus total system cost consists in part of "internal"
costs, incurred during the production of system components
manufactured by the prime contractor and "external" costs
representing the cost of acquired subcontracted components. This
suggests the broad conclusion that factors relevant to explaining
18
the cost of components manufactured by a prime contractor may
differ from factors relevant to explaining the cost of components
manufactured by a subcontractor. Stated another way, the degree
to which a model is effective in explaining total system cost may
depend on the mixture of prime and subcontractor components that
comprise the total system.
Consider the firm-wide activity rate (CR) of a prime
contractor. Increasing prime contractor activity should result in
the spreading of fixed costs over a larger output and thus reduce
the per unit cost of internally produced components. But the
activity rate of the prime contractor should have no impact on the
spreading of subcontractor fixed costs in manufacturing the
subcontracted component. Hence
H7 1 : Subcontracted unit costs should not be associated
with prime contractor activity rate (f
sub = 0) .
Consider the fixed costs (FC) of the prime contractor. Again
increasing fixed costs should result in increasing unit cost, as
previously discussed, for components manufactured by the prime
contractor. But changes in prime contractor fixed costs say
nothing about the cost structure of the subcontractor and
consequently should be irrelevant in determining the cost of
subcontracted components acquired by the prime contractor.
H8 1 : Subcontracted unit costs should not be associated
with prime contractor fixed costs (h sub = 0)
.
If subcontracted components are acquired by the prime
contractor by some form of cost-based contract then subcontractor
activity rate and fixed costs should influence the per unit cost
V-j
of subcontracted components. Hence, the per unit price paid by the
prime contractor for the components and the per unit cost of the
complete system assembled by the prime contractor should be
affected. As discussed previously, industry capacity utilization
(IR) may represent a surrogate for the degree of business activity
of subcontractors and the degree to which subcontractor capacity
costs are "spread" to reduce unit cost of components. To the
extent that industry capacity utilization does capture "activity"
and cost "spreading" of a subcontractor then subcontracted per unit
cost should be influenced.
H9 1 : Unit cost of subcontracted components should
decrease with increases in industry activity
(9sub < 0).
It was also suggested previously that from the perspective of
prime contractor cost, company-activity rate (CR) and fixed costs
(FC) may reflect the dominant factors influencing prime contractor
cost and that industry activity (IR) could be redundant. Put
another way, prime contractor CR and FC are more likely to
"matter", and IR is less likely to matter, when explaining prime
contractor cost. In constrast, prime contractor CR and FC are less
likely to matter, and IR more likely to matter when explaining
subcontractor cost. This suggests the general idea that the
importance of CR (of the prime contractor) and FC (of the prime
contractor) and industry IR in explaining prime versus
subcontracted costs should differ.
H72 : Unit cost of components manufactured by a prime
contractor will change (decrease) more strongly with
a change (increase) in prime contractor activity
rate than will unit cost of components manufactured
20
by a subcontractor (fprjme < fsub ) .
H8 2 : Unit cost of components manufactured by a prime
contractor will change (increase) more strongly with
a change (increase) in prime contractor fixed cost
than will unit cost of components manufactured by
a subcontractor (hnr . > h , ) .v prime sub'
H9 2 : Unit cost of components manufactured by a
subcontractor will change (decrease) more strongly
with a change (increase) in industry activity than
will unit cost of components manufactured by a prime
contractor (g .< g . )
.
v ^sub " prime'
The effect of prime contractor production rate (PR) on unit
cost of subcontracted components is more ambiguous. A change in
prime contractor production rate may lead to a change in the rate
at which components are ordered from a subcontractor and a
subsequent change in subcontractor production rate. Assume the
following:
PRori,™ = Order Rate = PR o ,Trime sub
Increasing PRPnme would increase the order rate, creating higher
demand and permitting a higher price charged by the subcontractor.
This would (from the perspective of the prime contractor) increase
unit cost. But increasing order rate permits increased PR
sub /
reducing per unit cost to the subcontractor, permitting a lower
price to be charged. This would reduce unit cost (from the
perspective of the prime contractor)
.
Alternatively, assuming that PRp
rime # Order Rate f PRsub is also
possible. Changes in PRprime may be anticipated and orders placed
early. Or changes in the order rate may be anticipated and PRsub
altered early. Thus potential effects of PRprjme on unit cost may
be modified by anticipation or lags in order rate and PR sub - In
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short no unambiguous hypothesis results. At most it might be
expected that
H 10 : The influence of prime contractor production rate
on prime contractor and subcontractor costs may
differ (dprime t dsub ) .
These hypotheses and other relevant issues will be
investigated for a sample of weapon system programs by fitting
various versions of model (16) to different cost series and




The sample consisted of eight missile system programs. Cost
and quantity data were taken from the U.S. Missile Cost Handbook
(Crawford, et. al., 1984), a comprehensive data source for U.S.
military missiles. Two initial constraints were placed on the
sample: 1. Navy ship-based tactical missiles programs and 2. data
availability. The handbook provided some information for 14 ship-
based missile programs but cost data was unavailable for four of
these, reducing sample size to 10.
Nine of the 10 systems were tactical surface-to-air missiles.
The tenth, a strategic/tactical surface-to-surface missile
(Tomahawk) was deleted to maintain a consistent mission within the
sample.
Observation of the remaining nine revealed that eight had a
common manufacturer—General Dynamics—while one system was
manufactured by Bendix. The one Bendix system was deleted. It was
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felt that the small loss in sample size would be more than offset
by the control over firm differences (i.e., organizational
structure, accounting systems) gained from having all sample
systems produced by the same contractor.
Table 1 contains information on the eight sample systems. The
"period" column reflects the period of production for the systems
for which data was available. The cost handbook contained cost
data aggregated for yearly production lots. The "lots" column
indicates the total number of production lots for each program
during the period of production. The "follow-on" designation
indicates whether a particular system was the first series of a new
missile design, or a follow-on series of a previously produced
design. Raw data to construct variables came from four sources:
1. Program data on cost and guantity: U.S. Missile Cost
Handbook.
2. Firm-specific accounting data: General Dynamics annual
reports, 10K reports and Moody's Industrial Manuals.
3. Industry capacity utilization data: Federal Reserve Board
reports (reproduced in Greer and Liao, 1983).
4. General Economic and Defense Budget Data: Historical
Tables (1990)
.
All data measured in dollars was inflation-adjusted to 1981
constant dollars. Cost data was available for four distinct cost
series
:
5General Dynamics produces accounting reports on a calendar
year basis, while missile systems are acguired in fiscal year
lots. Individual accounting data items were converted to a
fiscal year basis by taking a weighted average of data items for
the two calendar years that encompassed each fiscal year.
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1. Airframe: Airframe, nose piece, rollerons, wing/fin
sets, ballast load center, guidance and
control, system engineering, project
management.
2. Engine: Booster, booster fins, sustainer, engine,
rocket motor, gas generator.
3. Other: Miscellaneous
4. Flyaway: Sum of the above.
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the separate cost categories as a
percentage of flyaway cost. The analysis was conducted on three
cost series, the airframe, engine and total flyaway costs. Flyaway
cost was analyzed because it represents the sum of all component
costs and is an aggregate measure most often of interest to cost
analysts. Airframe cost was analyzed because it is the largest
single cost component and is the cost item most directly reflecting
the manufacturing activity of the prime contractor. Engine cost
was analyzed because it is the largest single cost component
subcontracted out. Different subcontractors were used to
manufacture the propulsion system for different missile programs.
One point of the analysis was to examine different cost behavior
(if any) between prime and subcontracted costs.
From Table 2 one may observe that the range of the percentage
of airframe cost to flyaway cost is not large (57-67%) , consistent




Several methodological approaches used in the analysis are




Program Program Period Lots Follow-On
Name Desiqnation
Tartar RIM-24B 1961-66 6 No
Terrier RIM-2D 1961-64 4 No
Terrier RIM-2E 1961-66 5 No
Standard MR RIM-66A 1966-70 5 No
Standard ER RIM-67A 1966-74 8 No
Standard MR RIM-66B 1971-80 10 Yes
Standard ER RIM-67B 1973-82 7 Yes



























research. Some preliminary discussion is necessary concerning
three issues.
Pooling of observations
. The standard approach to analyzing
program cost with learning curve models is to fit a separate model
to the observations for each separate program (a time series
model) . The implicit assumption is that relationships between
predictor variables and cost differ from program to program. There
are two problems with this approach. First the number of
sequential data observations for many programs is typically quite
small. Hence many programs are deleted from consideration and the
degrees of freedom for programs that do have sufficient data is
typically very low. (This may lead to very high but misleading R2
values for statistically fitted models.) Second, findings are
necessarily program specific. General conclusions result only if
model parameters are consistent and significant across a set of
individual program models, which often is not the case.
The approach used in this study was to pool the observations
across the set of programs (typically referred to as a pooled
cross-sectional time series analysis.) One benefit is that the
number of observations used to fit models and test relationships
is increased and hence the power of the tests is increased.
This approach implicitly adopts an alternative assumption that
relationships between cost and predictor variables are common
across the set of programs pooled. This assumption is more likely
to hold if the systems pooled are of a like kind and come from a
like production process. (This was one reason for limiting the
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sample to ship-launched tactical missile systems and discarding the
one system not manufactured by General Dynamics.) The assumption
is also consistent with some of the uses of cost models. One
purpose of investigating relationships between cost and explanatory
variables is to use the relationships to predict future costs. In
practice, "learning" experienced on systems already in existence
is used as a basis for assessing the learning that can be expected
on future systems of the "same type". Given this perspective, an
analysis that investigates model parameters for a pooled set of
systems of the same type may serve to average away system specific
;e".
Normalization of measures ; A problem in pooling observations
from multiple programs is that measures of cost (and some factors
expected to explain cost) for different individual systems are not
comparable. If unit cost for a single system falls from $100 to
$80 then something meaningful has happened. If unit cost of one
particular system is $100 and that of another system is $80, little
of interest can be said—of course the costs are different, the
systems are different.
To alleviate this problem, measures that are non-comparable
need to be normalized. In general this was achieved by selecting
a program-specific average and deflating by (dividing by) the
average. Details will be explained later. Normalization of
measures would have no impact at all on parameters for individuals
explanatory variables if models were constructed only for separate
systems. (All observations of a given measure would be deflated
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by the same program-specific average. Hence the normalized measure
would be linear transformations of the original measures.) When
observations are pooled, the choice of deflator has a potential
impact on parameter values. Some tests of sensitivity of results
to alternative deflators were conducted.
First Difference Models . Traditional approaches to cost
modeling attempt to explain the "level" of cost in terms of the
level of some explanatory factor, say production rate. An
alternative approach is to explain the "change" in cost from one
period to another in terms of the change in production rate—an
approach based on first differences. If a dependent and
independent variable are linearly (log-linearly) related, it can
be shown that, in principle, parameter values for the independent
variables should be the same in both kinds of models.
The advantage of a first difference model is that variable
measures reflect rates of change from period to period. Rates of
change measures are comparable across different programs. Hence
the choice of the normalizing deflator discussed above becomes a
non-issue
.
The disadvantage is that observations for two successive
periods are required to construct one rate of change measure.
Consequently sample size is reduced. Additionally, there can be
no rate of change measure for the first period of production.
(Because nothing was produced in the prior period there is no data
for comparison.) Another problem is that first difference models
appear to be much more sensitive to minor changes in the data.
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Hence, they are perhaps less reliable for estimating parameters.
(This will be commented on later.)
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES
Conceptually the dependent variable of interest is unit cost.
As indicated previously, to pool observations from different
programs it is necessary to deflate unit costs for each program to
create comparable measures. Thus for testing purposes unit cost









= Average unit cost for lot t of program i.
CAUCj = Cumulative average unit cost for program i at the
end of the program.
This measure deflates costs associated with individual lots
produced with the overall average unit cost based on total costs
and total quantities for the program. Hence UC is the ratio of a
cost at a particular point in time to the program average cost.
If average unit cost per lot were to decline consistently during
a program's life, then UC for early lots would be above one and UC
for later lots below one. If average unit cost per lot were to
fluctuate above and below a trend, then UC would tend to fluctuate
above and below one.
Note that the deflator, CAUC
1
-
, can in principle change for a
program as more lots are manufactured. Thus CAUCj (and
consequently UC-) depends on the specific given cost history for a
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program. This creates a need to adjust quantity measures to the
specific given quantity history for the program in order to make
quantity measures comparable. Cumulative quantity (Q) at each lot






= Cumulative quantity at the algebraic lot midpoint
of a particular production lot t for program
i.
TOTQj = Total program quantity = algebraic midpoint of
final lot produced for program i.
Conceptually Q it represents the proportion of the total program
quantity that has been produced at each lot. Note that Q. will
increase from zero to one as t increases. If "learning" occurs
then UC jt will decrease and Q it will increase as t increases,
reflecting the expected negative relationship. 6
Perhaps the most commonly used measure of production rate in
Other approaches were also attempted to measure UC, first a
learning curve was fit to the cost series for each program
individually, then the learning curve was used to estimate the
cumulative average cost at 1000 units. Then the average cost per
lot was deflated by the cumulative average cost at 1000 units.
This results in a UC measure which expresses lot average cost as
a ratio to program cost at a fixed (1000) number of units, for
all programs. To be consistent, Q was then measured as a ratio
of quantity at lot t to 1000 units. Thus both costs and
quantities were deflated by costs and quantities at 1000 units.
This approach provided findings consistent with the findings
reported in the paper. But there are two problems with the
approach. First conceptually it is circular. (A learning curve
is fit to arrive at a cost deflator which is used to create a
cost measure which then becomes the dependent variable to which
other learning curve models are then fit.) Second, most of the
program specific learning curve models were insignificant, most
likely because of few degrees of freedom.
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past studies is production quantity. Boger and Liao (1990) review
these studies and conclude that using production quantity to proxy
for production rate leads to conceptually incorrect and
statistically unreliable models. They recommend a ratio term be
used to reflect production rate, where production quantity in any
period is related to a standard production quantity, ideally the
capacity production quantity or production quantity to which the
manufacturer has tooled his facility. With this in mind production










= Production quantity in lot t for program i.
CAPQ
Jt
= Capacity quantity for program i.
The actual capacity quantity for each program was unknown. The
maximum lot quantity observed during the life of a program was used
as a surrogate. This surrogate is not unreasonable. Most programs
tend to start off with a small number of units produced in early
years and then build rapidly to a relatively constant number of
units per year (with occasional cutbacks and a tapering off in the
final years of a program) . Maximum lot quantity reflects this
"relatively constant number of units" and thus tends to reflect the
standard capacity. 7
Company-wide activity rate (CR) was measured as follows:
Tests were also conducted using the average lot size,
rather than maximum lot size, as a deflator when measuring PR.









WIP jt = Company-wide work-in-progress inventory during
the year of lot t production.
AWIPj = Average yearly work-in-process inventory over
the years of program i production.
Work-in-progress inventory is thus used as a surrogate for firm
wide activity. As WIP increases, overhead costs should be spread
over more (equivalent) units.
Industry activity rate was measured by industry capacity
utilization. Capacity utilization measures were taken directly
from Federal Reserve Board reports (as reproduced in Greer and
Liao, 1983). Measures, provided on a monthly basis, were averaged
to arrive at fiscal year capacity utilization. No deflation was
required as the measures are expressed as percentages.









= Firm-wide property, plant and equipment during
production of lot t.
APPEj = Average property, plant and equipment during the
years of production on program i
This measure assumes that fixed costs are driven by capacity and
that property plant and equipment provides a reasonable surrogate
for firm-wide capacity.
In the first difference (cost change) models all variables
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Variable jt . 1
Looking at company activity rate (CR) , for example:
^CR jt = CR. t = WIP- t
CRit -i WIP it-i
In the first differences formulation, the various deflators used
in calculating the original variables cancel out.
Each variable was transformed by taking the natural log of the
dependent and various independent variables. Log-log regressions
were fit to the transformed variables to estimate model parameters.
ANALYSIS
PROGRAM SPECIFIC MODELS
As a first step, individual learning curve models (eguation
12) were estimated for each of the eight separate programs. This
is the traditional approach and some findings of interest do
result. 8 Table 3 contains estimated b parameters, model R and
learning curve "slopes." Slopes are calculated from b by slope =
2 . Slopes are more intuitively meaningful: a slope of, say, .90
means that unit cost is reduced by 10% (i.e., 1.00 -.90) with a
doubling of quantity. Negative (positive) b values translate to
8Readers may note that the RIM-66E program is listed as
having only two lots in Table 1. Fitting a learning curve to
only two data points is not possible. In reality, two separate
lots were produced in 1981 and one lot in 1982 making three data
points available. The three points were used to fit the curve
reported in Table 3. The two 1981 lots were combined into one
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slope values less (more) than one and represent decreasing
(increasing) unit cost with increases in cumulative quantity.
Less than half of the individual models are significant—not
surprising given the problem of few observations and low degrees
of freedom—so results should be viewed with caution. But
interesting patterns are evident. First, the variance of slope
values is quite larger, generally falling between .80 and 1.10
across the three cost series and eight programs. This confirms the
problem identified earlier: attempting to use a model fit to any
one program to predict cost behavior expected for another program-
-even a program for the same type weapon system— is risky. The
large variance also suggests that the b parameter for quantity may
be picking up other influences on cost and exploration of other
such influences may prove beneficial.
A second pattern is also of interest. With the exception of
RIM-66A engine cost, the learning slopes for all costs of new
design programs are less than one and the slopes for all costs of
follow-on programs are above one. This provides some initial
evidence in favor of hypothesis 6. New programs do apparently
experience considerably greater cost improvement with increased
quantity when compared to follow-on programs. The result also
indicates the need to modify the empirical model when analyzing the
pooled observations.
POOLED RESULTS
If new designs can be expected to experience systematically
different learning rates than follow-on series, estimating one
33
learning parameter for pooled observations will be misleading. The
models presented so far included a single quantity term (Qb ) . To
allow for different rates between new and follow-on programs, the
single term can be replaced with two:
UCQ = a Q
Nb Q Fc
where
N = 1 if a new program, otherwise.
F = 1 if a follow-on program, otherwise.
b = Learning parameter for new designs.
c = Learning parameter for follow-on series of existing
designs
.
Separate parameters can then be estimated for new and follow-on
programs.
Results from fitting both single and duel parameter models to
the pooled observations, in both "cost level" and "cost change"
(first difference) form, are in Table 4. Note that two related
patterns are evident. First, looking at the duel parameter models,







Thus the general tendency for new programs to experience greater
learning is evident here in the pooled analysis.





< slope follOH . on . This merely confirms
intuition that failing to distinguish new from follow-on programs
and estimating a single parameter for Q provides a slope value that
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discards relevant explanatory information.
FULL MODEL RESULTS
Table 5 presents results from estimating models with all
relevant variable included. Since these multivariate models
control for the impact on UC of each of the potential cost drivers,
these models are the most appropriate to use for testing the
hypotheses.
Cumulative Quantity (Q) : Hypothesis 6 predicted greater
learning for new programs when compared to follow-on programs.
Consistent with the previous (Table 4) results, for all models in
Table 5 learning coefficients for new programs (b) are less than
learning coefficients for follow-on programs (c) . Formal F tests
were conducted to determine if this pattern was statistically
significant. For both airframe cost and flyaway cost, b values
were significantly less than c values (probability < .05) and thus
support for hypothesis 6 was found. The results for engine cost
were insignificant.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that learning parameters would be
negative, i.e., that cost reduction would occur with increases in
cumulative quantity produced. The significant negative b values,
in the cost level models, for all three cost series, indicates that
significant learning does occur for new designs. The corresponding
insignificant negative c values suggests no apparent learning for




It must be acknowledged that there are substantial differences
in the b and c parameters between the cost level and cost change
models. To explore this issue some simulations were run,
estimating model parameters using constructed data.
First a series of cost and guantity data with a known
"perfect" or "true" learning rate was created. As expected
estimating both cost level and cost change models produced models
with R2 = 1 and parameters exactly equal to the known true slope.
This confirms that in principle both approaches are equivalent.
Then two additional cost/guantity series were constructed, each by
adding a small amount of random noise to the "true" series, and
models were re-estimated. For the cost level models, R dropped
only marginally below 1 and parameter estimates were trivially
different from the known "true" parameter. For the cost change
model, R dropped significantly and parameter values diverged
substantially from the "true" parameter. The basic conclusion to
be drawn from these simulations is that models estimated using the
cost change approach are considerably more sensitive to changes in
the data and, therefore, perhaps less reliable for estimating true
parameters
.
Production Rate (PR) : Findings for production rate are
somewhat inconsistent. Significant negative d parameters for
flyaway cost (in both cost level and cost change models) reflect
a general tendency for total unit cost to decline as production





















r. kO cn a H O













^ VD VO rH in cm r- rf CO n cr.
U m *r in >x) ** m r- n co <m in
Uh -C




o — CM —* ,— <X> — CNJ — .-^
co a\ rH fN n cm r> r> CO \D in









1 1 1 1
*
1 1
r- --~ CT\ —
.
•-< — r\j s-~ ,—
,
-~-
o r- o r- CO m rs) n r^ ^r in «*
















r- — r- — r> ^-~ rH ^^ O ^~ r-~ ^
cr> o cr\ r- \0 r-~ O O rr rH r-\ r-<
















r~ --n n ^-~ VO — <J\ —.
— H -r)- n r~ r~- CPi O CO c^ co r^-
° O -( O <}• r-- in a\ n rn rH m
O'
1 1 1 1 1 1 <M r^ ^^
^ *~~ ^ ^-' ^^
+ +
+ + + *
X -> •> K
** — c-l ^ in ^ <^ *— r\j ^ —
3 * o CTi O "3" rH rf rH O ^r -* <-t
~2 i-i r- iH T rH CO ^f n co r-i r>
a X!







p c; rj CO (N rH
c r~i O (N c n -3-








CO X o C
u w > c rc 0)J En 0) >. E £ >. f
CO rX J f0 fa C U fC r QJ
< *_"; 5 P. c s >H C
M .^ 4-) (0 14-1 rH P fC m rH
a p [/] >1 p r '' >1 p D^
< < 1—
1
H c rH •H c














(1) <D c .c









Sh !-i Jh r




* * * ^.

airframe cost with increased production rate (significant negative
d in the cost level model) . The reduction in airframe cost was
apparently sufficient to offset an increase in engine cost
(significant positive d in the cost level model) . These findings
are also consistent with hypothesis 10 that the influence of
production rate on prime contractor and subcontractor cost may be
different. Such a conclusion, however, must be tentative given the
lack of significance of d for both airframe and engine cost in the
cost change models.
Company Activity Rate (CR) . Results for the company-wide
activity rate (of the prime contractor) are consistent with
hypotheses. Several patterns are worth noting. First, values for
parameter f are negative in all models, consistent with increased
activity reducing per unit cost. Second, comparing estimated
parameters for airframes and engines, f . ,_ is less than f Q„„ ; _.—
-> ' airframe engine
And f, lr.^ r=^ is significantly negative while fan„,„a is insignificantlyairframe -^ * 3 engine -* J
different from zero. This supports hypothesis 7.2. The prime
contractor's activity rate does drive costs of components actually
manufactured by the prime contractor, but the cost of subcontracted
components is unaffected. Additionally note that f flyaway is also
significantly negative. The fact that "internal" airframe cost
comprises a far larger proportion of flyaway cost than does
"external" engine cost would explain the effect of activity rate
on total flyaway cost.
Fixed Capacity Cost (FC) : Results for FC are also consistent
with hypotheses. Values for parameter h are uniformly positive,
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consistent with higher prime contractor fixed costs driving up unit
production cost. But while h values are significant for airframe
cost they are not significant for engine cost. Thus prime
contractor capacity costs are relevant to explaining internally
manufactured components and do not affect subcontracted items.
Fixed cost does explain flyaway cost (h flyaway is significantly
positive) . Again the likely explanation is that airframe cost
comprises a large proportion of flyaway cost.
Industry Activity Rate (IR) : Results for IR are consistent
with hypotheses. Values for parameter g are uniformly negative,
consistent with greater industry activity reducing per unit cost.
But again different results are evident for prime and subcontracted
costs. Values for g are significant for engine cost. Apparently
industry capacity utilization does reflect information concerning
the degree to which subcontractors may be able to spread fixed
costs and reduce per unit cost. In contrast values for g are
insignificant for airframe cost. This is consistent with the idea
that by including prime contractor PR, CR and FC in the model, IR
may be redundant, and hence unimportant. Note that IR is
significant in explaining flyaway cost (significant g in the cost
level model). Given that flyaway cost is the aggregate of both
prime and subcontracted costs, finding some ability of industry
capacity utilization to explain flyaway cost is not surprising.
The pattern of parameters reinforces these findings:
q < q,. < q . ,
^engine "flyaway "airframe
Finding a parameter value for flyaway cost that is an "average" of
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the separate parameters for the engine and airframe costs is
consistent with flyaway cost being an aggregate of the two.
EXTENSIONS
MODEL PREDICTION ERRORS
Due to the limited number of missile systems no holdout sample
is available for model validation. The only data available for
testing model performance is the same data used to derive the
models. While not ideal, observing the performance of alternative
models, created by selectively including variables, does provide
some indication of the ability of variables to enhance prediction.
Current cost estimation practices rely most heavily on the
traditional learning curve model (perhaps enhanced with the
inclusion of a production rate term) . As a benchmark, learning
models were first estimated including only cumulative quantity (Q)
as an independent variable (i.e., equation 17). Then separate
models were estimated adding one additional variable (PR, CR, IR,
or FC) to the learning model. Finally a model including the
variables found significant during hypothesis testing (Table 5,
cost level models) was estimated for each cost series.
The criteria used to measure model performance was the
absolute prediction error, measured by the difference between
predicted unit cost and actual unit cost as a percentage of
predicted cost. Table 6 provides results. The "improvement"
column in the table reflects the proportionate reduction in error
achieved by adding variables to the benchmark Q model. The
"ranking" column provides a rank ordering of the models (1 = best)
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based on minimum error (and maximum improvement)
.
Not surprisingly the models including all significant (sig.)
independent variables are most accurate. For all three cost series
average absolute prediction error is about 20%. For both airframe
and flyaway cost, using all significant variables in the models
reduces error, relative to the benchmark learning model, by about
33%. The relative improvement for engine cost is considerably less
dramatic.
The results also suggest which variables have the most
important impact on reducing prediction error. For both flyaway
and airframe cost, including either PR or CR to the benchmark model
reduces prediction error most substantially. For engine cost, IR
provides the most noticeable marginal improvement. The general
conclusion to be drawn is that the inclusion of rate terms reduces
error. But the value of specific rate terms depends on the cost
series. Prediction of internal cost (i.e., airframe manufactured
by the prime contractor) is improved most by attention to firm
specific rate measures - PR and CR. Prediction of external costs
(i.e., subcontracted engine cost) is improved most by attention to
a broader industry rate measure - IR. The pattern is consistent
with the conclusions suggested by the hypothesis tests.
EXPLAINING PREDICTION ERRORS
Defense procurement, particularly for major weapon systems,
is specialized in nature. Both the product and market are not
typical of products and markets in general. The market for defense





























Q,PR 22 . 8% 25.3
Q,CR 24.7% 18.8
Q,IR 29. 1% 4.6
Q,FC 29.7% 2.6
Sig. 20.4% 33.8
Q 23 . 3% _
Q,PR 23 . 1% .5
Q,CR 22.4% 3 .7
Q,IR 22. 3% 4.0








1. Model includes the variables listed. Sig. means inclusion of
only the variables that were significant in the Table 5 cost
level models.




Improvement percentage = (Average absolute from benchmark
model - Average Absolute error from alternative model) 4- Average




only a few (oligopolistic) sellers. Prices are determined
primarily through a bid and negotiation process. A bid is accepted
and a contract for a specified number of units is negotiated prior
to production. Prices (costs to the government) are specified in
the contract and are based on costs incurred ("cost plus") using
some agreed upon formula. Cost estimates and their source are
disclosed at the time of contract negotiation, so some agreement
on the validity of cost estimates is established up front.
The analysis so far has focused on what can be labeled
"production" cost drivers; the factors analyzed (quantity, various
activity rates, fixed cost) all relate to what it costs a
manufacturer to produce an item. An implicit assumption adopted
so far is that buyer cost is directly related to the cost incurred
by the manufacturer during production. The assumption is
reasonable given some form of cost-based pricing arrangement. The
fact that the set of production cost drivers were useful in
explaining buyer cost additionally supports the assumption.
Assume that there is a buyer cost that can be "justified" by
manufacturer cost. This buyer cost would depend on, and be
explainable by, the production cost drivers. Under cost-based
acquisition, notions of this justified buyer cost (UC-) would serve
as a starting point for negotiation of an actual buyer cost (UC
a
) .
But actual buyer cost would likely be influenced by factors other
than the production cost drivers. Hence there would be some
deviation (DEV) between actual buyer cost and justified buyer cost:
UC = UC. + DEV
a j
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One question remaining is what factors may cause buyer cost
to differ from justified cost? When might DEV be relatively high
or low? The degree to which UC
a
will differ from UCj should depend
on the relative strengths of the negotiating positions of the buyer
and manufacturer, and conditions influencing the negotiations.
Several variables are discussed below. 10 Each is an attempt to
reflect some broad feature of the environment at the time
negotiation and procurement occur. For each factor, how that
factor might influence prices offered by a contractor and accepted
by DoD are discussed. Hence each factor is a potential explainer
of DEV. To the extent that these factors influence negotiations




Defense Spending . What was the political and budgetary
environment like at the time of production? Were constraints being
imposed on defense spending? Were defense or non-defense programs
favored? It was felt that contractors would have less incentive
to offer a low price (and perhaps government negotiators would have
less pressure on them to demand a low price) if the political
environment appeared favorable to defense spending. The degree of
defense spending was measured by defense spending as a percentage
Obviously the variables examined here don't exhaust the
possible factors that may influence cost. Contract type, the
presence of competition or a second source, various contract
incentives are relevant. The variables selected here were
limited by two considerations. First, data availability.
Second, and more to the point, since the analysis is attempting
to explain year-to-year differences in cost within a set of
programs, the desire was to examine factors that also vary from
year-to-year.
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of total federal spending at time t, the year of production. A
positive relationship between defense spending and cost was
expected.
General Economic Conditions : Economic conditions - growth or
contraction - may influence program cost. If the economy is
robust, demand for products should be relatively greater, markets
for alternative products supplied by contractors may be more
plentiful, and incentives to "give" on price for a particular
defense contract may be reduced. When economic contraction occurs,
defense programs may appear more appealing and the increased
incentives to seek such contracts may result in lower prices.
Economic conditions were measured by the rate of growth in GNP from
time t-1 to t. A positive relationship between GNP growth and cost
was expected.
Commercial Business ; Government contractors also have
business segments devoted to commercial products. Evidence (Greer
and Liao, 1986) indicates that defense business is less profitable
and more risky than commercial business and that defense business
may be more attractive (to absorb a firm's overhead burden) when
commercial opportunities are less available. This suggests that
the incentive for a contractor to "give" on price may be related
to the amount of commercial business available. Amount of
commercial business was measured as the proportion of commercial
business activity to total business activity at time t. A positive
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relationship between commercial business and cost was expected. 11
Inflation ; Inflation makes future dollars worth less than
current dollars. When the inflation rate is high contractors may
compensate for its effect by building a cushion into the price they
offer in order to cover expected higher costs. Lehman (1988)
argues that acquisition process itself is structured so as to
encourage raising future prices due to past inflation. This occurs
because the Program, Planning and Budget System builds past
inflation into future cost estimates. Contractors, aware of this
upward bias caused by the built-in inflation factor, automatically
raise prices to the level they know is permitted by the inflation
factor. Tyson et. al .
,
(1989) also discuss this issue, arguing
that costs will be too high or too low depending on whether future
inflation is less than or greater than anticipated inflation. To
the extent that past inflation leads to an increment being added
to negotiated costs, costs may be explainable with reference to
past inflation. Inflation was measured by the rate of change in
the producer price index from t-2 to t-1. A positive relationship
between inflation and cost was expected.
Time : The environment in which military acquisitions occur
has not remained static. Scrutiny of the acquisition process by
the Congress and the public has increased. Calls for increased
competition are heard. Oversight, regulations and procedures
governing acquisition have been revised and altered over the years.
Data to measure proportion of commercial business was
unavailable for 12 observations; hence tests are based on only 35
observations.
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Tyson et. al. (1989) describes four major eras in defense
acquisition, each characterized by different acquisition
initiatives and processes. One additional question is whether
these changes have lead to any consistent trend on cost over time.
A year variable (fiscal year at time of production) was included
in the analysis to examine any time trend.
Dependent Variable ; A measure of the degree to which actual
cost (UC
a
) differed from justified cost (UC) was needed. For each
of the three cost series, UC was regressed on the specific
production cost driver variables that had been found to be
significant in the previous analysis (i.e., Table 5, cost level
regressions) . These regression were used to predict unit cost.
These predicted unit costs were interpreted at the cost that is
explainable by the production cost drivers and consequently
"justified 11 . Empirically, the difference between actual and
predicted cost was measured as a percentage:
DEV = Actual UC - Predicted UC
Predicted UC
Thus the variable DEV is measured as the degree to which actual
cost exceeds or is less than the cost predicted by knowledge of the
production cost drivers. This measure is the same that was used
in the Table 6 analysis of prediction errors, except absolute value
operators are absent. An attempt to explain this measure is
equivalent to an attempt to explain the variance in unit cost that
is left unexplained by the production cost drivers.
Tests : Table 7 provides simple pairwise correlations between
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DEV and the hypothesized explanatory variables. 12 There are
significant results for four of the five variables. The
correlation signs suggest the following patterns: There is a trend
toward higher cost over time (positive correlation with fiscal
year) . Cost tends to decrease as defense spending increases
(contrary to expectations) . Cost tends to increase with GNP
growth. This is consistent with a robust economy resulting in a
stronger negotiation position for a contractor and a resultant
higher cost to DoD. Cost tends to increase with higher rates of
inflation. This is consistent with an inflation "premium" being
built into negotiate cost. Results for commercial business are
non-significant.
These patterns must be interpreted with caution. Table 8
shows pairwise correlations between all of the explanatory
variables that are significant and, in several cases, very high.
For example, fiscal year, defense spending and GNP growth are all
inter-correlated at .90 or greater. The correlation matrix
indicates that during the years encompassed by the observations,
defense spending (as a proportion of federal spending) decreased,
GNP growth rate increased, commercial business percentage increased
and inflation rate increased.
This approach is similar to correlating residuals from the
production cost driver regressions with the hypothesized
explanatory variables. The difference is that the production
cost driver regressions were of log-log form and hence the
residuals are not expressed as cost errors but rather as log cost
errors. The prediction errors analyzed here are actual cost
minus predicted cost, not actual log cost minus predicted log
cost. Results from both approaches were similar.
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TABLE 7




























* prob. < .10
** prob. < .05
*** prob. < .01
TABLE 8
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EXPLANATORY FACTORS
Variables 1 2 3 4 5
1. Defense Spending 1.00
2. GNP Growth -.91 1.00
3. Commercial Business -.79 .62 1.00
4. Inflation -.81 .75 .58 1.00
5. Fiscal Year -.96 .94 .65 .79 1.00
Given the high intercorrelations, it is difficult to identify
which individual factor or factors may have influential cost. On
the basis of the Table 7 correlations, inflation is the strongest
explainer. For each of the three cost series, the correlation for
inflation is the highest and most significant of the five factors.
As a further test, stepwise regressions were run, allowing the
stepwise procedure to select the most important variable. For all
three cost series, inflation was selected first. No additional
variable was a significant explainer of cost, given inflation.
Perhaps the relatively stronger results for inflation is
plausible. The links between inflation rate and actual buyer cost
are relatively direct. As discussed before, the links rest on
explicit procedures in the planning and budgeting process that
factor past inflation into cost estimates that form the basis for
negotiating actual buyer cost (Lehman, 1988; Tyson et. al., 1989).
The links between general environmental conditions such as defense
spending and GNP with the cost of a particular individual system
are more tenuous. If inflation is the driving factor, the results
for the other variables are likely due to their high correlation
with inflation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to identify and investigate
factors (cost drivers) that influence and therefore explain unit
cost of systems. The premise was that average unit costs per
production lot would vary as a function of conditions surrounding
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the manufacture of each lot. The analysis started by presenting
some simple functional models of unit cost; the objective of these
models was to identify potential cost drivers and isolate the
expected effect of these cost drivers on unit cost. Empirical
models were then developed to test the expected relationships.
Tests were conducted using data from eight surface-based tactical
missile systems manufactured by General Dynamics. Distinctions
were made between two kinds of programs (new designs versus follow-
on series) and between the cost of two types of system components
(internally prime contractor manufactured components versus
externally subcontracted components) . The role of particular
factors in explaining cost was expected to differ according to
these distinctions. The broad findings were as follows:
1. Significant learning (cost reduction) is evident with
increases in cumulative guantity produced during the manufacture
of new designs. Learning during the manufacture of new series of
existing designs is not evident.
2. The role of production rate as a cost driver is ambiguous.
The results indicated a negative relationship between unit cost
production rate for prime contractor manufactured components but
a positive relationship for subcontracted components. No general
statement concerning production rate as a cost driver is possible.
The impact of production rate on cost may be situation specific.
This conclusion is consistent with the previous findings reported
in the literature (e.g., Smith, 1980).
3. Company-wide activity is a potentially important cost
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driver. Unit cost decreases with increases in company-wide
activity. This is consistent with the idea that greater activity
permits the assignment of fixed cost to a wider corporate output
and consequently the assignment of less fixed cost burden to a
particular program. This result holds for the cost of components
manufactured by prime contractors. The result does not hold for
the cost components subcontracted.
4. Although aggregate total system unit cost (flyaway cost)
was found to be reduced with increases in prime contractor
activity, the relevance of prime contractor activity rate to
explaining total system cost is likely to depend on the relative
proportion of total system cost composed of internally manufactured
components and externally subcontracted components.
5. Company-specific fixed capacity cost is a potentially
important cost driver. Unit costs increase with increases in
property, plant and equipment. Again this result held for prime
contractor manufactured components, not for subcontracted
components.
6. The relevance of fixed capacity costs to explaining
aggregated total system unit cost (flyaway cost) is also likely to
depend on the relative proportions of prime contractor and
subcontracted components in the total system.
7. Industry activity rate is relevant to explaining the cost
of externally subcontracted components. Unit cost decreases as
capacity utilization increases. This suggests that industry
capacity utilization may provide a workable surrogate for business
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activity of subcontractors. It also confirms, using a different
approach and different sample, the findings of prior research
(Greer and Liao, 1986)
.
8. The relevance of capacity utilization in explaining total
cost of a system is likely to depend on the relative proportion of
subcontracted components in total cost.
9. Cost prediction error can be reduced materially by
enhancing a learning curve model with inclusion of additional
production cost driver variables. Variables reflecting relevant
activity rates appear to add the most to prediction accuracy.
10. Costs to the buyer are influenced by factors beyond those
that influence production cost. Of these factors, inflation rate
appears to be most important. The degree to which cost to DoD
exceed cost that can be "justified" in terms of production factors
is associated with the past rate of inflation. This is consistent
with an inflation premium being built into cost.
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